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The Impact of Climate Policy on U.S. Aviation 
Niven Winchester*,†, Christoph Wollersheim‡, Regina Clewlow§, Nicolas C. Jost‡,  
Sergey Paltsev*, John Reilly* and Ian A. Waitz‡,**  
Abstract 
We evaluate the impact of an economy-wide cap-and-trade policy on U.S. aviation taking the American 
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R.2454) as a representative example. We use an economy-
wide model to estimate the impact of H.R. 2454 on fuel prices and economic activity, and a partial 
equilibrium model of the aviation industry to estimate changes in aviation carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions and operations. Between 2012 and 2050, with reference demand growth benchmarked to 
ICAO/GIACC (2009) forecasts, we find that aviation emissions increase by 130%. In our climate policy 
scenarios, emissions increase by between 97% and 122%. A key finding is that, under the core set of 
assumptions in our analysis, H.R. 2454 reduces average fleet efficiency, as increased air fares reduce 
demand and slow the introduction of new aircraft. Assumptions relating to the sensitivity of aviation 
demand to price changes, and the degree to which higher fuel prices stimulate advances in the fuel 
efficiency of new aircraft play an important role in this result. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Worldwide aviation is expected to grow by just under 5% per year for the next two decades 
(Airbus, 2009; Boeing, 2010). This growth will have environmental consequences via noise, air 
quality and climate impacts (Mahashabde et al., 2010). Potential mitigation methods include 
regulations and standards, technological improvements involving aircraft and engine 
performance and/or the development of alternative fuels, operational improvements, and market-
based policies. In regard to market-based policies, the House of Representatives recently passed 
the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454, also known as Waxman-
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Markey Bill). H.R. 2454 proposes an upstream cap-and-trade policy to curtail greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. Such a policy would affect all U.S. industries, as refineries would be required 
to purchase allowances for each potential ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. In the long run, 
refiners will pass on these increased costs to consumers, such as airlines. Based on the 
specifications of H.R. 2454, this study analyzes the impact of climate policy on aviation 
operations, financial outcomes and emissions. 
The impact of cap-and-trade programs on aviation has been examined by several studies, 
which are summarized in Appendix 1. Most analyses focus on the emissions and economic 
impacts of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).1 Other studies, also with an EU-ETS focus, 
examine legal issues associated with including aviation in cap-and-trade programs (Oberthuer, 
2003; Haites, 2009; Peterson, 2008), or the impact of climate policy on airline competition 
(Albers et al., 2009; Scheelhaase et al., 2010; Forsyth, 2008). To our knowledge, Hofer et al. 
(2010) is the only study to focus on the impact of a U.S. cap-and-trade policy. Hofer et al. (2010) 
uses a partial equilibrium model to simulate the environmental impacts of an assumed airfare 
increase. We contribute to this literature by analyzing the impact of a cap-and-trade policy on 
U.S. aviation using an economy-wide model and a detailed partial equilibrium model of the 
aviation industry. We use our economy-wide model to estimate the impact of a cap-and-trade 
policy (taking H.R. 2454 as a representative example) on the fuel price, the price of emissions 
allowances and the overall level of economic activity. Given these predictions, a partial 
equilibrium model is employed to estimate changes in aviation emissions and operations. To our 
knowledge, we are the first to analyze the impact of climate policy on aviation by combining a 
climate policy model and a detailed aviation model. 
This paper has five further sections. Our modeling framework is detailed in Section 2. Section 
3 outlines the scenarios we consider. Modeling results are presented in Section 4. A sensitivity 
analysis is detailed in Section 5. The final section provides a short summary and conclusions. 
2. MODELING FRAMEWORK 
Our analysis employs version 4 of the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) 
model (Paltsev et al., 2005) and version 4.1.3 of the Aviation Environmental Portfolio 
Management Tool for Economics (APMT-E, MVA Consultancy, 2009). EPPA is used to 
determine the economy-wide impacts of climate policy and, given predicted changes in key 
variables simulated by EPPA, APMT-E calculates the impact of climate policy on aviation 
emissions and operations.  
EPPA is a recursive dynamic, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the global 
economy that links GHG emissions to economic activity. The model is maintained by the Joint 
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change at the Massachusetts Institute of 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Anger (2010), Boon et al. (2007), Ernst & Young (2007), Hofer et al. (2010), Mayor and Tol 
(2010), Mendes (2008), Morrell (2007), Scheelhaase and Grimme (2007), Vespermann and Wald (2010) and Wit 
et al. (2005). 
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Technology, and has been widely used to evaluate climate policies (see, for example, Paltsev et 
al., 2007, 2009).  EPPA models the world economy and identifies the U.S., 15 other regions and 
nine sectors, including electricity and refined oil. Reflecting EPPA’s focus on energy systems, 
electricity can be produced using conventional technologies (for example, electricity from coal 
and gas) and advanced technologies (for example, large scale wind generation and electricity 
from biomass). Advanced technologies enter endogenously when they become economically 
competitive with existing technologies. Refined oil includes refining from crude oil, shale oil, 
and liquids from biomass, which compete on an economics basis and can be used for 
transportation. EPPA is calibrated using economic data from the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) database (Dimaranan, 2006), energy data from the International Energy Agency (IEA, 
2004), and non- CO2 GHG and air pollutant from the Emission Database for Global Atmospheric 
Research (EDGAR) 3.2 database (Olivier and Berdowski, 2001) and Bond et al. (2004). The 
model is solved through time, in five-year increments, by imposing exogenous growth rates for 
population and labor productivity. 
APMT-E is one of a suite of models developed by the Office of Environment and Energy at 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for assessment of aviation-related environmental 
effects. The model is designed to examine aviation industry responses to policy measures. 
APMT-E is a global model that determines operations for country pair-stage length 
combinations, known as schedules. Most country pairs have one stage length, but some country 
pairs involving large countries have more than one stage length. For example, the U.S.-UK 
country pair has five stage lengths, reflecting geographic disparity in U.S. points of departure or 
disembarkation. AMPT-E also identifies six world regions (North America, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Europe, Asia and the Pacific, The Middle East and Africa), 23 route groups (for 
example, North Atlantic, Domestic U.S., North America-South America and Europe-Africa), 
nine distance bands (for example, in kilometers, 0-926, 927-1853, and 6483-8334), 10 aircraft 
seat classes defined by the number of available seats (for example, 0-19, 20-50 and 211-300) and 
two carrier types (passenger and freight).  
Aviation operations are determined in each year by retiring old aircraft based on retirement 
functions. The surviving fleet is then compared to forecast capacity requirements to determine 
capacity deficits by carrier region, distance band and carrier type. Potential new aircraft, which 
are combinations of available airframes, engines and seat configurations, are evaluated by 
calculating operational costs (including fuel, depreciation, finance and maintenance costs, and 
route and landing charges) per seat hour over the life of the aircraft. Once new aircraft are 
purchased to meet fleet deficits and added to the surviving aircraft, the fleet is deployed across 
schedules and operating costs are calculated. Assuming a constant cost markup, cost calculations 
are used to derive airfares, which are combined with route group price elasticities to compute 
demand. The constant markup assumption implies that all costs associated with a cap-and-trade 
policy are passed on to consumers. Although airlines may absorb some short-run cost increases, 
it is difficult to imagine an industry repeatedly absorbing cost increases to continue to operate, so 
a full pass-through assumption is commonly used in long-run assessments of the impact of cap-
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and-trade policies on aviation (see, for example, Anger and Köhler, 2010). APMT-E price 
elasticities, sourced from Kincaid and Tretheway (2007), represent the average response of 
business and leisure travelers and vary by route group. Price elasticities range from -0.36 for the 
Transpacific route group to -0.84 for the Intra-European route group. After a solution is found, 
differences between actual and forecast demands are used to update demand projections for the 
next period. 
Our APMT-E reference scenario mainly follows ICAO/GIACC (2009). Traffic and fleet 
forecasts are from the Forecast and Economic Analysis Support Group (FESG) at the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), adjusted by the short-term FAA Terminal 
Area Forecast (TAF). Aircraft fuel efficiency rises by 1% per year. Airspace management 
improvements driven by Next Generation (NextGen) High Density Analysis are first 
implemented in the U.S. and then in other regions with a five-year lag. NextGen improvements 
are assumed to result in detour reductions relative to great circle distances in the U.S. of 3% in 
2015 and 10% in 2025. Corresponding decreases for non-U.S. regions occur in 2020 and 2030. 
Load factors, average stage lengths and aircraft retirement schedules are consistent with FESG 
forecasts used for the eighth meeting of the Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection 
(CAEP/8).  
The main influence of H.R. 2454 on aviation is likely to occur via the bill’s impact on the fuel 
price and the overall level of economic activity. Accordingly, in our policy scenarios, using 
output from EPPA, we change fuel prices and demand forecasts used by APMT-E. Guided by 
Gillen et al. (2002), we assume an income elasticity of demand of 1.4 to convert GDP changes 
estimated by EPPA into changes in aviation demand. As EPPA has a five-year time step and 
APMT-E is solved for each year, we use linear interpolation to generate annual series for EPPA 
predictions. 
3. SCENARIOS 
We model climate policy in the U.S. using H.R. 2454 as representative cap-and-trade policy. 
The first major action by the U.S. Congress to address climate change, H.R. 2454 sets an 
economy-wide target for GHG emissions, measured in CO2 equivalent (CO2-e) units, released 
between 2012 and 2050.2 The chief emissions reduction instrument in H.R. 2454 is a cap-and-
trade system that would cover between 85% and 90% of all U.S. emissions. Other provisions, 
such as efficiency programs, target emissions from uncovered sectors. Following Paltsev et al. 
(2009a, Appendix C), we simplify analysis of the policy by assuming that the cap-and-trade 
program applies to all sectors. The cap is gradually tightened through 2050. It is 80% of 2005 
emissions (5.6 gigatons, Gt, of CO2-e) in 2020, 58% (4.2 Gt) in 2030, and 17% (1.2 Gt) in 2050.  
Under H.R. 2454, U.S. emissions may exceed the above targets if carbon offsets are used. 
Offsets allow businesses to support eligible offset projects, as determined by the Environmental 
                                                 
2 CO2-e units measure concentrations of other GHGs, such as methane and nitrous oxide, relative to the climate 
impacts of one unit of CO2 over a specified time period, usually 100 years. 
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Protection Agency (EPA), in lieu of turning in allowances. Offsets are restricted to 2 Gt – 1 Gt 
from domestic sources and 1Gt from international sources – per year. We consider two offset 
scenarios to capture uncertainties concerning the evolution of the market for offsets and the 
impact of competition from foreign cap-and-trade programs. In a “full offsets” scenario, 2 Gt of 
offsets are available each year at a specified cost. In a “medium offsets” case, we assume that the 
quantity of offsets available increases linearly from zero in 2012 to 2 Gt in 2050. Another 
provision in H.R. 2454, allowance banking, allows firms to over-comply in early years and bank 
the excess of allowances for use in later years. As the stringency of the emissions constraint 
increases over time in H.R. 2454, banking reduces compliance costs. When firms can bank 
allowances, optimal behavior will equate the discounted price of CO2 allowances across years. 
We assume a discount rate of 4%. 
We model climate policies in other regions following a recent Energy Modeling Forum 
scenario (EMF, Clarke et al., 2009). In the EMF scenario, developed nations (excluding the 
U.S.) gradually reduce emissions to 50% below 1990 levels by 2050, and China, India, the 
Former Soviet Union, and South America begin curtailing emissions in 2030. A difference 
between H.R. 2454 and climate policy in the EU is that H.R. 2454 requires energy producers, 
such as oil refineries, to turn in allowances while end users, such as airlines, are required to 
submit allowances in the EU-ETS. However, as we assume that costs are passed through to 
consumers, “upstream” and “downstream” policies produce identical results. Additionally, 
although allocation rules have distributional effects, in our analysis the value of emissions 
allowances represent windfall gains or losses, so allocation rules do not influence operating 
decisions.  
A contentious issue in the application of climate policy to aviation is how a nation’s climate 
policy will influence foreign carriers flying to and from that nation, as is evident from court 
action by the Air Transport Association (ATA) challenging the legality of requiring flights by 
U.S. airlines to and from the EU to purchase allowances under the EU-ETS. In our analysis, 
airlines pay carbon charges embedded in fuel prices, so airlines are influenced by foreign cap-
and-trade programs when they uplift fuel abroad. For example, a U.S. airline flying to the EU 
pays the U.S. CO2-e price when uplifting fuel in the U.S. and the EU CO2-e price when refueling 
in the EU.   
In addition to CO2 emissions, aviation operations may influence climate via emissions of non- 
CO2 gases and soot and sulfate particles which alter the atmospheric concentration of GHGs. 
Although some additional effects contribute to warming and others to cooling, non- CO2 effects 
are believed to contribute to warming in aggregate (Penner et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2009). 
Aviation climate impacts from non- CO2 sources are sometimes characterized by a metric – 
known as a multiplier – that divides the total impact of aviation on climate by the CO2 impact. 
Although proposals requiring airlines to purchase allowances for non- CO2 effects have been 
discussed in policy circles, such as the European Parliament, it remains uncertain whether such 
measures will be applied. To capture these uncertainties, we consider multiplier coefficients of 
one and two. When the multiplier is one, non- CO2 effects are not considered, while a multiplier 
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of two is used to capture non- CO2 effects in our analysis. We refer to simulations employing a 
multiplier of one as “no aviation multiplier” scenarios and simulations with a multiplier of two as 
“aviation multiplier” scenarios. To reflect the increased scarcity of allowances in multiplier 
scenarios, we reduce economy-wide emissions caps based on estimates of the contribution of 
aviation to aggregate GHG emissions from Lee et al. (2009). 
To consider alternative offset and multiplier combinations, we implement four scenarios: full 
offsets with no aviation multiplier (F1), full offsets with an aviation multiplier (F2), medium 
offsets with no aviation multiplier (M1), and medium offsets with an aviation multiplier (M2). 
These scenarios capture a wide range of possible outcomes. The cap on cumulative emissions 
between 2012 and 2050 is 17% lower in full offset scenarios than in medium offset scenarios, 
and policy-induced aviation fuel price increases in multiplier scenarios are more than twice as 
large as fuel price increases in no multiplier scenarios. 
4. RESULTS 
Table 1 reports per ton CO2-e prices ($/t CO2-e), measured in 2005 dollars, and proportional 
changes in GDP due to climate policy in three years: 2015, 2030 and 2050. In the F1 scenario, 
the emissions price is $7 in 2015 and rises by 4% (our assumed discount rate) per year so that the 
price reaches $13 by 2030 and $29 by 2050. In the medium offsets scenario without an aviation 
multiplier, M1, CO2-e prices are around three times larger than in the F1 scenario. In the two 
multiplier scenarios, F2 and M2, increased demand for allowances increases CO2-e prices 
relative to the corresponding no multiplier scenarios but only slightly (for example, in the 
medium offsets case, including an aviation multiplier increases the 2015 CO2-e price from 
$21.31 to $22.25). The treatment of the aviation multiplier also has a small impact on GDP 
changes, which range from -0.11% to -0.33% in 2015 and from -0.95% to -1.95% in 2050.   
As noted above, H.R. 2454 will result in income-induced aviation demand changes and raise 
fuel prices. Income-induced demand changes are estimated by multiplying GDP changes by 1.4, 
to reflect an underlying income elasticity of demand. The largest income-induced demand 
change, which occurs in scenario M2 in 2050, is 2.73%. Therefore, this effect is modest 
compared to the impacts on demand of changes in fuel prices.  Proportional change in aviation 
fuel prices reflect the price of CO2-e emissions and the number of allowances that must be 
purchased per ton of emissions. In scenario F1, the price of aviation fuel increases by 4.7% in 
2050 relative to the reference scenario, while the corresponding price increase in the M1 scenario 
is 26.7%. Fuel price changes in multiplier scenarios are more than twice as large as in 
corresponding non-multiplier scenarios, as the multiplier is applied to a higher CO2-e price than 
in no-multiplier scenarios. 
7 
 
 
Table 1. U.S. CO2-e prices (in 2005 dollars) and aviation fuel price and demand changes 
relative to the reference scenario. 
Scenario 
CO2-e price 
($/t CO2-e) 
GDP-induced demand 
change (%) 
Fuel price change 
(%) 
 2015 2030 2050 2015 2030 2050 2015 2030 2050 
F1 $7.27 $13.09 $28.69 -0.11% -0.43% -0.95% 5.83% 4.60% 4.74% 
F2 $7.79 $14.03 $30.74 -0.12% -0.48% -1.15% 12.50% 9.20% 18.10% 
M1 $21.31 $38.39 $84.07 -0.31% -1.01% -1.83% 17.50% 17.82% 26.72% 
M2 $22.25 $40.07 $87.08 -0.33% -1.09% -1.95% 36.67% 41.38% 65.09% 
 
How do changes in fuel prices influence aviation emissions and operations? Estimated annual 
aviation CO2 emissions for the period 2012-2050 under our reference and four policy scenarios 
are presented in Figure 1. In the reference scenario, CO2 emissions increase from 250 million 
metric tons (Mt) in 2012 to 580 Mt in 2050, a 130% increase. In policy scenarios, emissions 
trajectories are lower than in the reference case but absolute emissions continue to increase 
substantially over the policy period, by between 97% in the most stringent scenario (M2) and 
122% in the least stringent scenario (F1). Thus, airlines respond to H.R. 2454 primarily by 
paying higher fuel prices rather than changing operations. This finding is consistent with other 
studies of the impact of climate policy on aviation emissions (see Anger, 2010; Mendes and 
Santos, 2008; Vespermann and Wald, 2010).  
Three explanations emerge for the small impact of H.R. 2454 on aviation emissions. First, the 
results indicate that aviation emissions mitigation options are more expensive than mitigation 
operations elsewhere. This is because, as fuel costs are a significant share, around 26% (IATA, 
2010), of total aviation costs, airlines already operate closer to the fuel efficiency frontier than 
other industries. There is also limited scope for airlines to switch to alternative, low-emitting fuel 
sources compared to industries such as electricity, where coal can be replaced by several 
relatively inexpensive, low-carbon energy sources. In our EPPA simulations, the largest 
proportional reduction in sectoral emissions is observed for electricity in all scenarios. In the M1 
scenario, electricity emissions fall by 60% relative to reference 2050 emissions. Second, despite 
large fuel price increases, demand changes induced by H.R. 2454 are small, as aviation demand 
is inelastic and the policy results in modest GDP changes. Third, as detailed below, the fleet 
becomes less fuel efficient in our policy scenarios than in the reference case. 
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Figure 1. Aviation CO2 emissions in the reference and policy scenarios, 2006-2050. 
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Our finding that H.R. 2454 reduces fleet efficiency warrants greater discussion. Fleet 
efficiency is gauged by fuel use per available ton kilometer (ATK). As there is a one-to-one 
mapping between fuel burn and CO2 emissions, proportional changes in fuel use equal 
proportional changes in CO2 emissions. Fuel use per revenue ton kilometer (RTK), which 
depends on load factors, is also informative, as this metric indicates fuel use per passenger 
kilometer. Changes in these variables induced by H.R. 2454 relative to the reference are 
presented in Table 2. In scenario M1, fuel per ATK increases by 0.2% in 2015, 0.5% in 2030 
and 0.6% in 2050. Similarly, in other scenarios, H.R. 2454 increases fuel per ATK relative to the 
reference through time. Decreases in load factors, relative to the reference, are larger in 2015 
than later years, as it takes some time for airlines to adjust aircraft stocks in response to demand 
changes. Load factor decreases are larger in more stringent scenarios than less stringent 
scenarios. Fuel use per RTK is influenced by fleet efficiency and load factors. The largest 
changes in fuel per RTK are observed for the M2 scenario, where fuel per RTK increase by 4.7% 
in 2015, 1.6% in 2030 and 2.3% in 2050, relative to the reference.  
Table 2. Changes in fuel use per ATK and per RTK, and load factors relative to the 
reference. 
Scenario ATK  RTK  Load factor 
 2015 2030 2050  2015 2030 2050  2015 2030 2050 
F1 0.1% 0.2% 0.3%  1.0% 0.5% 0.5%  -0.9% -0.3% -0.2% 
F2 0.2% 0.5% 0.7%  1.8% 1.2% 1.3%  -1.6% -0.6% -0.6% 
M1 0.2% 0.5% 0.6%  2.4% 0.7% 1.2%  -2.1% -0.3% -0.5% 
M2 0.5% 1.0% 1.4%  4.7% 1.6% 2.3%  -4.1% -0.6% -1.0% 
 
We examine the drivers of our fleet efficiency results by displaying proportional changes in 
fleet size, average aircraft age and average aircraft size relative to the reference in Table 3. In all 
scenarios, fewer new aircraft are purchased relative to the reference, so the number of aircraft in 
the fleet decreases and aircraft age increases on average. As new aircraft tend to be larger than 
existing aircraft, average aircraft size also decreases. Thus, the decrease in fleet efficiency is not 
only driven by airlines flying older, less efficient aircraft, but also, when selecting from the same 
set of technologies as in the reference scenario, airlines purchasing smaller aircraft, which burn 
more fuel per ATK. In APMT-E, fleet efficiency changes are driven by two opposing forces: (i) 
rising fuel prices, which accelerate the introduction of new, more fuel efficient aircraft, and (ii) 
reduced demand, which slows the introduction of new aircraft. In our simulations, the demand 
effect dominates the fuel-price effect.  
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Table 3. Changes in the number of aircraft in the fleet, average aircraft age and average     
aircraft size relative to the reference. 
Scenario    Number of aircraft  Average age  Average size 
 2015 2030 2050  2015 2030 2050  2015 2030 2050 
F1 -0.5% -1.9% -4.2%  0.5% 0.4% 0.8%  0.0% -0.2% -0.7% 
F2 -1.2% -3.8% -8.3%  1.0% 0.8% 1.5%  0.0% -0.3% -1.1% 
M1 -1.9% -4.7% -8.7%  1.5% 1.0% 1.2%  0.0% -0.1% -0.3% 
M2 -3.7% -8.7% -16.0%  3.1% 1.6% 2.2%  0.0% -0.1% -0.3% 
 
A major concern for the aviation industry is the impact of H.R. 2454 on profitability. In this 
connection, the U.S. Air Transport Association (ATA) estimates that the bill would increase U.S. 
airline industry costs by $5 billion in 2012 and $10 billion in 2020 (Khun, 2009). Our results are 
in broad agreement with these numbers: estimated fuel cost increases range from $1.1 (F1) 
billion to $6.8 billion (M2) in 2012, and from $2.7 billion (F1) to $21.4 billion (M2) in 2020. 
However, cost increases in APMT-E are passed on to consumers via increased fares, so cost 
increases only influence profits via their impact on demand.  
To examine changes in financial viability of the aviation sector, we report changes in financial 
indicators relative to the reference in Table 4. Unit (per seat mile) operating costs are affected by 
rising fuel prices, decreased average efficiency, and reduced load factors. Consequently, unit 
operating costs increase by 1.9% in 2015, 2.9% in 2030 and 5.0% in 2050 in scenario F1, and 
larger cost increases are observed for scenarios with higher CO2-e prices. As expected, profit 
changes are negatively correlated with fuel price changes. The largest proportional profit 
decreases, for scenario M2, are 6.2% in 2015, 9.4% in 2030 and 17.1% in 2050, or (in 2006 
dollars) $0.4 billion in 2015, $0.9 billion in 2030 and $2.9 billion in 2050.   
Table 4. Changes in total operating costs, unit costs and operating profits relative to the 
reference. 
Scenario  Operating Costs  Unit Costs Operating Profits  
 2015 2030 2050 2015 2030 2050 2015 2030 2050
F1 0.5% -0.2% -1.3% 1.9% 2.9% 5.0% -1.1% -2.5% -5.4%
F2 1.1% 1.2% 2.1% 4.0% 7.6% 15.6% -2.2% -5.0% -10.3%
M1 1.3% 0.4% -0.3% 5.5% 6.4% 11.5% -3.2% -5.0% -9.5%
M2 2.9% 3.0% 4.8% 11.5% 15.3% 29.8% -6.2% -9.4% -17.1%
 
5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
An important finding in our analysis is that H.R. 2454 reduces fleet efficiency. In this section, 
we investigate the robustness of this result to key components of AMPT-E. Specifically, we 
examine the sensitivity of results to aircraft retirement decisions, aircraft fuel-efficiency 
improvements, and income and price elasticities. As above, proportional changes in fuel use per 
ATK relative to the reference scenario are used to measure efficiency changes. Table 5 reports 
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efficiency changes in 2015, 2030 and 2050 for our F1 scenario, for the base case and for each 
sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity results for other scenarios follow a similar pattern. 
Table 5. Changes in fuel use per ATK relative to the reference for the F1 scenario. 
Sensitivity scenario       2015              2030              2050 
Base 0.10% 0.24% 0.27%
Lower old aircraft survival probability 0.10% 0.21% 0.22%
Higher new aircraft efficiency (reference & policy) 0.11% 0.27% 0.29%
Higher new aircraft efficiency (policy only) -0.44% -4.01% -10.63%
No income-induced demand change 0.06% 0.19% 0.24%
Zero price elasticity demand -0.40% -1.59% -2.69%
5.1 Aircraft retirement decisions 
As noted in Section 2, aircraft retirements in APMT-E are based on FESG-CAEP8 retirement 
functions. Retirement curves are assumed to follow a Weibull distribution. Specifically, the 
probability that an aircraft of a certain age will survive in a given period under policy, ρpolicy, is: 
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where ρbase is the survival probability in the FSEG forecast, ∆C is the cost of flying the existing 
aircraft minus the cost of flying new aircraft, and λ is the sensitivity of the survival probability to 
cost differences. 
In a sensitivity analysis, we increase λ from 0.03 to 0.04, which decreases the survival 
probability of existing aircraft under climate policy, relative to our base F1 scenario. As 
illustrated in Table 5, earlier retirement of old aircraft decreases fuel per ATK relative to our 
base F1 scenario. However, changes in fleet fuel burn per ATK are small (fuel burn relative to 
the reference case increases by 0.21% in 2030 and 0.22% in 2050, compared to 0.24% in 2030 
and 0.27% in 2050 in our base F1 scenario). 
5.2 New aircraft fuel efficiency  
In another sensitivity analysis, we increase the scope for airlines to respond to rising fuel 
prices by purchasing new technologies. New aircraft fuel efficiency rises by 1% per year in 
APMT-E. In a sensitivity analysis, we impose a 1.5% annual fuel efficiency improvement, which 
we apply to both the reference and policy scenarios. With higher new aircraft efficiency, fuel use 
per ATK increases relative to the reference, as in our base F1 scenario. 
We also consider a sensitivity analysis where higher fuel prices induced by H.R. 2454 spur 
development of new technologies. In this analysis, new aircraft efficiency improves by 1.5% 
annually in the policy case and 1% annually in the reference case. In this case, unlike in our base 
scenario, fleet fuel efficiency increases relative to the reference – by 0.44% in 2015, 4.01% in 
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2030, and 10.63% in 2050. These efficiency changes are large, but not unexpected given that the 
growth rate for new aircraft efficiency is 50% larger in the policy scenario than in the reference. 
This simulation indicates the importance of technology responses to price changes. 
5.3 Income and price elasticities 
H.R. 2454 slows the introduction of new aircraft by reducing the demand for aviation. 
Accordingly, in separate sensitivity analyses, we examine the impact of the income elasticity of 
demand and price elasticities of demand. In one analysis, we set the income elasticity of demand 
for aviation equal to zero, so GDP changes induced by climate policy do not influence aviation 
demand. Under such a scenario, fuel per ATK decreases relative to the base F1 scenario, but still 
increases relative to the reference scenario, by 0.24% in 2050. In another analysis, we set the 
price elasticity of demand for aviation equal to zero. Under this extreme price-response 
assumption, fuel use per ATK, relative to the reference, decreases by 0.40% in 2015, 1.59% in 
2030 and 2.69% in 2050.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We examined the impact of climate policy on aviation emissions and economic outcomes in 
the U.S.. Our analysis, benchmarked to ICAO/GIACC (2009) forecasts, estimated that aviation 
emissions between 2012 and 2050 will increase by between 97% and 122% under H.R.2454, 
compared to 130% without climate policy. These results indicate that aviation emissions 
abatement options are costly relative to mitigation options in other sectors. Key determinants of 
marginal abatement costs in APMT-E include the specification of new aircraft capital costs, fuel 
efficiency improvements, and retirement rates. Currently, there are limited opportunities for 
airlines to replace more CO2-intensive energy sources with less CO2-intensive energy sources, 
and to substitute between energy and other inputs.  
Another noteworthy finding is that, under the set of assumptions in our framework, GDP and 
fuel price changes induced by H.R. 2454 reduce fleet efficiency, as the demand effect 
outweighed the fuel-price effect. That is, the impact of reduced demand for aviation on new 
aircraft purchase decisions dominated incentives to purchase more efficient aircraft in the face of 
rising fuel prices. We examined the sensitivity of our results to several key modeling 
assumptions. In general, our finding that H.R. 2454 reduces average fleet efficiency is robust to 
plausible alternative modeling assumptions examined in our sensitivity analyses. However, our 
fleet efficiency results were overturned when we assumed that aviation demand was perfectly 
inelastic, and when we assumed that fuel price increases induced by H.R 2454 increased the fuel 
efficiency of new aircraft by 50%, relative to the reference scenario. 
Several caveats to our analysis should be noted. First, as we focused on long-run trends, 
adjustments associated with business cycles were not considered. In economic downturns, 
airlines may park old aircraft, which are replaced by new aircraft in high-growth periods rather 
than brought back into service. Second, our modeling framework did not capture some 
adjustments available to airlines using the existing fleet. For example, we did not allow airlines 
to retrofit seat configurations or use slower flight speeds in response to fuel price changes. Third, 
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we did not consider how changes in air traffic management, induced by climate policy, might 
improve operations and reduce emissions. When these adjustments are considered, climate 
policy may have a larger positive impact on fleet efficiency than in our study. Future research 
will focus on this. 
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APPENDIX: LITERATURE REVIEW  
Several studies examine the impact of climate policy on aviation. To date, most papers focus 
on the EU-ETS. Some studies analyze the general implications of cap-and-trade schemes or 
carbon taxes. To our knowledge, only one study, Hofer et al. (2010), focuses on U.S. Table A1 
summarizes the literature to date. Studies can be grouped into three categories: (1) papers 
focusing on aviation financial indicators and environmental benefits from reduced aviation 
emissions, (2) analyses of the competitive effects of carbon policies, and (3) studies that analyze 
legal and political aspects. Studies focusing on legal aspects include Haites (2009), Oberthuer 
(2003), and Peterson (2008). Studies examining the impact of climate policy on airline 
competition tend to analyze case studies (Albers et al., 2009; Forsyth, 2008; Scheelhaase et al., 
2010). Papers that assess the financial and environmental implications of including aviation in 
climate policy either utilize existing models (Anger, 2010; Boon et al., 2007; Wit et al, 2005) or 
develop new models (Ernst and Young, 2007, Hofer et al., 2010; Mendes, 2008, Morrell, 2007, 
Scheelhaase and Grimme, 2007; Vespermann, and Wald, 2010). All studies in this group use an 
assumed allowance price, except Anger (2010), who uses a dynamic macroeconomic model. 
 
 
 
  
 
Table A1. Studies evaluating the impact of climate policy on aviation. 
Study Methodology Scope Key Assumptions Key Findings 
Anger (2010) 
Dynamic macro. 
model 
EU-ETS 
Allowance prices €5-€40 per ton of 
CO2; full cost pass-through; 
efficiency improvements of 1% p.a. 
Air transport CO2 emissions decrease by 
up to 7.4%, relative to baseline in 
2020.   
Boon et al. (2007) AERO-MS model EU-ETS 
Allowance prices €15 to €45; 47.3% 
to 100% cost pass-through in 2020. 
Evidence of perfect competition.  
Ernst & Young (2007) Simulation model EU-ETS 
Allowance prices €6- €60; 29% to 
35% cost pass-through; fuel 
efficiency improvements of 1% p.a. 
Airline profits decrease by €40 billion 
over the period 2011 to 2022. 
Hofer et al. (2010) Simulation model 
Carbon tax on 
U.S. Aviation 
Air fare increase of 2%; price 
elasticity of -1.15; cross-price 
elasticity (air/car) of 0.041%. 
Five billion ton reduction in aviation 
emissions. Increase in vehicle 
emissions of 1.65 billion lbs (2,540 
million additional passenger miles).  
Mayor and Tol (2010) 
Hamburg 
Tourism Model 
EU-ETS; 
Carbon taxes 
in some 
countries 
EU-ETS allowance price €23, full cost 
pass-through; carbon taxes of €11-
€45 in the Netherlands and €14- €54 
in the UK.  
The three policies reduce global welfare 
by €12.6 billion. Tourists shift away 
from the taxed areas. 
Mendes and Santos 
(2008) 
Simulation model EU-ETS 
Allowance prices €7, €15, and €30, 
full cost pass-through. 
Demand reductions due to EU-ETS less 
than 2%. Small supply-side emissions 
reductions due to high abatement 
costs. 
Morrell (2007) 
Three UK case 
studies  
EU-ETS 
Allowance price $40; full cost pass-
through. 
Climate policy has a larger impact on 
low cost carriers than full service 
airlines.  
Scheelhaase and 
Grimme (2007) 
Simulation model 
 
EU-ETS 
Allowance prices €15-€30; full cost 
pass-through; fuel efficiency 
improvements of 1% to 1.47% p.a. 
Small costs increases due to the EU-
ETS compared to recent fuel price rises; 
the EU-ETS creates competitive 
distortions. 
Vespermann and Wald 
(2010) 
 
Risk analysis 
software 
EU-ETS 
Allowance prices are normally 
distributed with an expected value of 
€25. 
The EU-ETS reduces the annual growth 
of CO2 emissions by about 1% per 
year; Small financial impacts on 
aviation; Small competition distortions.  
Wit et al. (2005) AERO-MS Model  EU-ETS 
Allowance prices €10-€30; full/no 
cost pass-through; fuel efficiency 
improvements of 1% p.a. 
Industry-wide CO2 emissions reductions 
of 20-26 Mt (13%-22%) in 2012. 
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